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1. Beyond Sovereignty
Demands for national self-government have been among the most 
difficult issues to resolve in the practice of modern constitutionalism. 
They are not merely about the accommodation of different cultures, 
which might be managed in a variety of ways. Nor are they limited 
to territorial differentiated demands in public policy, to which the 
classical response is decentralization or federalism. National demands, 
rather, concern the nature and bounds of the political community and 
the locus of ultimate authority. It is not that nations, defined in some 
objective sense, have an inherent right to self-government: we know 
that nations are made and remade, that they are based on subjective 
and inter-subjective sentiment, they are sociological constructions, 
and they are often contested. Yet the very process of construction and 
the self-definition of the group as a nation in themselves entail they 
aspiration to be self-determination; this is the essential difference 
between nationalist and regionalist demands. For much of the twen-
tieth century, political scientists assumed that the difference was 
Article received 24/04/12; approved 03/06/12.
10
REAF, núm. 16, octubre 2012, p. 9-29
Michael Keating
rather that the national demand or claim to self-determination in-
volved for a separate state. It is now recognized that statehood is only 
one possible outcome of the national claim and that there are many 
other constitutional formulas that can accommodate it (Keating, 
2001a). The observation that national movements in the present are 
making claims for something other than statehood has also provoked 
a round of historical revisionism and a recognition that many nation-
ality movements before the First World War were actually seeking 
forms of autonomy within imperial and international structures rath-
er than statehood. This was the case with many of the nationalities 
of the Habsburg Empire, and even Sinn Féin was founded in 1906 
pledged to a British dual monarchy on the lines of the Austro-Hun-
garian Ausgleich of 1867. Statehood is particularly difficult in pluri-
national states where nationality sentiments and claims overlap, so 
that it is impossible to agree on clear lines on the map.
In fact a review of the demands made by nationalist movements 
in developed countries in recent years shows that a claim to immedi-
ate statehood is the exception rather than the rule. Some parties, 
such as successive Breton regionalist movements, have always been 
more confederalist than separatist. Convergència i Unió in Catalonia 
has never come out for secession, although it has been careful not 
to rule it out as a future possibility. Flemish nationalists have been 
successively federalist and confederalist, with separatism only emerg-
ing rather recently as a minority option. Even parties supporting in-
dependence tend to present it in a rather attenuated form. Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya is for independence, in the long term 
within a new Europe; in the meantime its proposals look more con-
federal. The Basque Nationalist Party is for self-determination but 
divided between those who really believe in independence and more 
moderate element and has never officially been separatist. Plaid 
Cymru-Party of Wales has traditionally been closer to Home Rule than 
independence and, on those occasions when it has come out for in-
dependence, it has surrounded it with qualifications. The same is true 
in Quebec, where the Parti Québécois adopted the formula of sov-
ereignty-assocation in the 1980s then, having officially abandoned it 
after the referendum of 1985, effectively returned to it with its 1995 
proposals of sovereignty-partnership. The Scottish National Party has 
usually been the exception, pledged, at least since the 1940s, to in-
dependence but in the late 1980s has put this in a European context 
and, in recent proposals, has embraced what some have called ‘inde-
pendence-lite’, which involves keeping the pound sterling and various 
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regulatory agencies, and reaching common policies on a wide range 
of issues.
While nationalist parties have backed away from classic inde-
pendence, the parties of the state or their local branches have in 
some cases moved towards the idea of self-determination. Sections 
of the Spanish left have incorporated the idea, while in 1988 almost 
the entire Scottish Parliamentary Labour Party signed the Claim of 
Right asserting that sovereignty belonged to the Scottish people. 
Tensions within Belgian parties become so strong in the 1970s that 
they split into separate language wings, often adopting almost na-
tionalist positions.
The result of all this is the emergence of a plethora of proposals 
for constitutional change that reject both the idea of separate state-
hood and that of a unitary sovereign state. Some of these are what 
has come to be known in Scotland as ‘devolution-max’, stretching 
devolutionary or federal principles to the limit, while others represent 
‘independence-lite’, secession while keeping much of the constitu-
tional infrastructure of the existing state. At the limit, these merge 
into a constitutional middle ground, which defies conventional con-
stitutional categories.
The philosophical underpinning for all this is the idea of ‘post-
sovereignty’ (McCormick, 1999; Keating, 2001a). Like other post- con-
cepts, this does not suggest that sovereignty has disappeared, rather 
that it has been transformed and is no longer the dominant mode 
of political organization. There are several strands to the argument. 
The first concerns the idea of sovereignty as a normative legal prin-
ciple. Traditional conceptions, originating in Bodin and later fortified 
by English constitutionalists like Blackstone and Dicey, see sovereign-
ty as absolute and indivisible. States can therefore divide power 
through federal arrangements or decentralization, but cannot divide 
sovereignty. Post-sovereignty thinking holds that sovereignty refers, 
rather, to original authority not derived from a higher source, and 
that there can be multiple sources of it. So Basque nationalists hold 
that their historic rights, the fueros, are original law and not deriva-
tive of the Spanish constitution of 1978. Scottish nationalists (and 
many non-nationalists as well) hold that Scotland did not surrender 
its entire sovereignty to a unitary and ominicompetent British parlia-
ment in 1707. Quebeckers (both nationalists and federalists) will ar-
gue that Canada is properly seen as a compact of founding nations 
which did not abandon their claims to be the subjects of self-deter-
mination. Indeed it can be argued that in none of these cases has the 
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question of sovereignty been definitively and convincingly resolved. 
In each of them there are rival versions of rights, usually rooted in 
competing historiographies (Keating, 2001a). It is also argued, in the 
case of the European Union, that it itself constitutes a distinct sphere 
and source of law, no longer a mere delegatee of nation states (Mc-
Cormick, 1999).
The second element is to see sovereignty not as a ‘thing’ that a 
people has, but a relationship, which means that it always has to be 
negotiated with other sovereignty-holders and is usually embedded 
in wider transnational structures. This is not a new idea, but harks 
back to understandings of historic rights common in Europe before 
the rise of the integrated nation-state in the nineteenth century, and 
surviving in empires down to the First World War. It is also visible it 
traditions of covenants or pactism as constitutional practice in many 
places and in modern understandings of autonomy (Gagnon and Keat-
ing, 2012).
The third element is functional. Legal scholars will often insist 
that sovereignty is a normative legal concept and that it is not made 
redundant by the fact the sovereign entities may not actually have 
any power. Political scientists, on the other hand, would argue that, 
if sovereignty and power are completely dissociated, then the former 
becomes an empty concept of little use in constitution-making. The 
transformation of the state as a result of global economic change and 
interdependency, does therefore result in a reduction of sovereignty, 
albeit in a selective way, since some states retain more power than 
others. Small states can, paradoxically, best protect their remaining 
sovereignty and exercise real power through integration into larger 
transnational structures.
The fourth element is institutional. Transnational structures, in-
cluding international trading regimes, international law, internation-
al human rights regimes and, most obviously, the European Union, 
have eroded national sovereignty. While state elites will often claim 
that these are arrangements into which states enter of their own free 
will and from which they are free to withdraw, the argument becomes 
less convincing as the costs of withdrawal become clear. Such costs 
may be economic. They may also be political as the costs of defying 
international norms may be a loss of legitimacy or influence, a bigger 
problem for small democratic nations than for hegemonic or non-
democratic states.
The idea of post-sovereignty does not in itself resolve any of the 
issues of national accommodation but it does shift the focus of argu-
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ment. Nationality arguments in the United Kingdom, Spain and even 
Canada or Belgium, are not, as is sometimes assumed (Kymlicka, 2007), 
fundamentally about culture or different ways of life. Language issues 
are being managed, in a more, or less, conflictual way through public 
policy and variants of bilingualism. Social values in the component 
nations of these states are not diverging, but converging. Religious 
issues are not the source of conflict which they were during the nine-
teenth and much of the twentieth century; even in Northern Ireland 
religion is an ethnic identifier rather than a case of doctrinal conflict. 
The question, rather, is that of the boundaries of political community. 
In what has been described as de Tocqueville’s paradox (Dion, 1991), 
these conflicts can become stronger rather than weaker as cultural 
cleavages diminish. The reason, I have argued elsewhere (Keating, 
2001a, 2009) is that both sides are now claiming the same normative 
terrain, based on shared liberal democratic and (usually) welfare val-
ues; the argument is about the framework in which these values will 
be realized.
This argument is not just about the object of self-determination 
(statehood or autonomy) but the subject (Herrero de Miñon, 1998), 
the definition of the nation and the boundaries and nature of the 
political community. They cannot be resolved within monist structures 
based on the idea that there can be only one nation. On the contrary, 
political communities are never entirely self-contained and citizens 
legitimately can, and in practice do, often have multiple identities. 
These in turn are often asymmetrical, as in Spain and Canada, where 
the majority has single national identity, which includes the minorities, 
while most of the latter have two identities, with their smaller nation 
and with the state as a whole.
These competing conceptions of sovereignty, of political com-
munity and identity can never be resolved once and for all. Spanish 
nationalists who insist that the political nation was created in the 
Constitution of Cadiz in 1812 will never see eye to eye with Basque 
nationalists or even non-nationalist supporters of the foral tradition. 
English Diceyians will not agree with Scottish lawyers who see the 
1707 Union as fundamental law or compact. Quebec supporters of 
the two-nations theory will not accept the idea of a single nation 
created by confederation in 1867. Years have been wasted in Spain 
and Canada on the illusion that a single narrative can be agreed or 
imposed. In some ways the United Kingdom has been better off, 
since the genius or traditional British unionism is that it permitted 
and even celebrated different narratives in the constituent nations 
14
REAF, núm. 16, octubre 2012, p. 9-29
Michael Keating
but the efforts of the last Labour Government to create a unifying 
Britishness, of which the national variations would be subordinate 
themes, suggested that they had forgotten what unionism was all 
about. Pierre Trudeau had made a similar mistake in Canada in seek-
ing to create single Canadian identity and reduce the national claims 
to a set of linguistic rights and a variety of multiculturalism to go 
along with the others.
The way out of these difficulties is through a constitutional plu-
ralism which allows us to arrive at shared institutions in different ways 
and is tolerant of asymmetry. Constitutions in uninational societies 
are often expressions of shared identity, which are then linked to 
values (which can be universal values), and to rights and duties of 
citizenship. Constitutions in plurinational states, on the other hand, 
are about living with diversity. This, to repeat, is not just a matter of 
cultural diversity (which is broader phenomenon) but about the basis 
for nation, legitimacy and political community. Constitutional plural-
ism does not require us to dig down to the ontological and legal 
foundations before we can agree on procedures. Nor does it require 
that we agree on the telos, or end point of constitutional agreement. 
What does matter is that we agree on procedures, and can reach 
regular agreements on the division of powers. It also requires a shared 
commitment to constitutionalism, that is to working within institu-
tions, proceeding according to democratic principles and not unilater-
ally changing the rules.
2. Self-Determination
International law and political theory have tended to identify the 
right of self-determination with that of secession and, consequently, 
to hedge it with conditions. Typically, it is conceded only as a reme-
dial right in the face of repression or, in the ‘salt water’ doctrine, a 
right of colonized people (Buchanan, 1991). This has several unfortu-
nate consequences. It invites nationalists to stage confrontation or 
even provoke repressive reaction. It has also led to some unconvincing 
attempts by European nationalist movements to depict themselves as 
colonized. Where there is repression or denial of rights, the only rem-
edy available seems to be statehood. So in the case of Kosovo, after 
Milosovic had violated the existing autonomy arrangements and the 
western powers had intervened, the remedy might have been to re-
store autonomy under international guarantees; instead the majority 
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of the international community supported the more drastic and desta-
bilizing alternative of stated; and this despite the evidence that Ko-
sovo was hardly viable as a state.
It might be altogether more helpful to develop a doctrine of 
self-determination as the right to negotiate one’s position within the 
state and international order rather than as limited to secession. This 
is also in line with the emerging principle of addressing these matters 
not as questions of nationality (with all its subjective elements) or 
ethnicity (undefinable and ethically dubious) but as matters of de-
mocracy, when democracy concerns not just politics within a given 
polity but the shape of the polity itself. Where citizens have clear 
preferences, the assumption must be that these should prevail unless 
there are over-riding ethical objections. Where preferences are di-
vided, there needs to be compromise.
3. Independence-Lite and Devolution-Max
There is a now a substantial literature exploring notions of plurina-
tionality and national accommodation at a philosophical and theo-
retical level (Requejo, 1998, 1999; Gagnon and Tully, 2001). There is 
also abundant evidence that both nationalist parties and public opin-
ion are open to this type of thinking (Keating, 2001a,b). In repeated 
surveys over many years in Spain, Canada and the United Kingdom, 
voters fail to make a sharp distinction between independence and 
devolution, seeing it more as a spectrum of options and bundles of 
powers (Keating, 2001a). There is less academic work on the details 
of what a ‘third way’ might look like but there have been some po-
litical proposals. These include rival independence-lite and federalism-
max proposals from the Parti Québécois and the Liberal Party of Que-
bec (Allaire, 1991); autonomy-max proposal from Convergència i Unió 
(2003) and independence-lite proposals from the Basque First Minister 
Juan-José Ibarrexte (2002) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(2003); and independence lite proposals from the Scottish National 
Party (Scottish Government 2009) and devolution-plus proposals from 
Reform Scotland (2011).
The Parti Québécois proposed that Quebec should become sov-
ereign, in association with Canada (1980) or having made an offer of 
extensive partnership with Canada (1995). Sovereign in this case seems 
a rather softer word for independent, although the meaning of the 
term is elusive and the 1995 proposals were negotiated with the Bloc 
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Québécois1 and the Action Démocratique de Québec (ADQ). The Al-
laire proposals, part of Quebec Liberal Premior Robert Bourrassa’s 
strategic game, suggested that Quebec should gain extensive powers, 
leaving Canada with only foreign affairs and defence and some re-
sidual competences. After Bourrassa had abandoned them, a section 
of his party split off to form the ADQ. The Ibarretxe and Esquerra 
proposals have a lot in common, both using the formula of ‘free as-
sociated state’, which resembles the sovereignty-association idea and 
recalls the term used for Puerto Rico. CiU opted for a ‘new national 
statute’, without invoking any particular constitutional concept but 
focusing rather on powers and relationships. In 2012 the congress of 
its Convergència component called for an Estat propi (own state), a 
highly ambiguous term that avoids the language of independence. 
Reform Scotland has focused on fiscal powers and placed its proposal 
within the devolution family, calling them ‘devolution family plus’. 
When it comes to characterizing them in constitutional law, perhaps 
the only thing that these various proposals have in common is that 
they defy the usual categories of independence, confederalism, fed-
eralism and devolution.
None of them, it should be said, has prospered. The Parti Québé-
cois proposal was defeated decisively in the referendum of 1980 and 
very narrowly in 1995. The Quebec Liberal proposals enshrined in the 
Allaire Report were adopted in the aftermath of the failure of the 
Meech Lake Accord in the early 1990s and used mostly as a bargaining 
chip. Convergència i Unió’s ideas have been first part of a negotiated 
process which produced the 2006 reform of the Catalan statute of 
autonomy, and later a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision to 
reinterpret key elements of the statute. Esquerra Republicana formed 
part of the tripartite Catalan government that negotiated the new 
statute although, after it had been amended in the Spanish Parlia-
ment, they turned against it. The Ibarretxe Plan was rejected by the 
Spanish Parliament as unconstitutional, while the Constitutional Court 
rejected a subsquent attempt to hold a referendum on its principles. 
The Scottish proposals are currently under discussion.
Although some of these proposals might be characterized as 
independence-lite and others as devolution or federalism-max, that 
has more to do with their origins and with procedure than with their 
1. The Quebec nationalist party in the federal Parliament then led by the moderate Lucien 
Bouchard.
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end point. The rival Quebec proposals of the 1990s differed less in the 
powers that would go to Quebec than in the fact that the Liberal 
Party proposed to negotiate half way out of Canada, while the Que-
bec three-party agreement proposed to leave Canada and negotiate 
half way back in. The Ibarretxe Plan and the Esquerra proposals in-
volved more of rupture with the existing constitutional order than 
the CiU plans, which were presented as something that could be 
achieved within the existing constitution but that, too, is a matter of 
procedure rather than substance. It is often said that one clear distinc-
tion between devolution, however extended, and independence is 
the continued presence or otherwise of members of the territory in 
the central parliament, but even this is not clear. The Quebec propos-
als of 1995 envisaged proposed a joint ministerial council, in which 
each side would have a veto, with extensive powers; and a parliamen-
tary assembly in which Quebec would provide 25% of the members 
(Entente, 1995). The Esquerra proposals explicitly say that Catalonia 
would send members to the Spanish Senate but is silent on participa-
tion in the lower house, as is the Ibarretxe Plan, although it seems to 
suggest a continued Basque presence. To divide the proposals a prio-
ri into secessionist and non-secessionist would therefore prejudice the 
analysis and condemn us, through a semantic sleight of hand, to re-
produce the old nationalist schema. In what follows, I look at a series 
of issues which arise in all of them, only then returning to the overall 
characterization.
The various proposals address the issue of sovereignty and self-
determination more or less explicitly. All the Québécois, Basque and 
Catalan proposals start from the premise that the nation is self-deter-
mining and that the next stage of constitutional change will represent 
an act of self-determination, negotiated with the state. All are based 
on the idea of a community of self-governing nations and deny that 
it is legitimate for the state to change the relevant constitutional 
provisions without their consent, even though this is possible in Spain2 
and happened in Canada in 1982. Like the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention of the 1990s they rest on the idea that self-determination 
is not limited to the right to secede. They all also include provision 
for the settlement to be ratified by referendum or, in the case of non-
2. Individual statutes of autonomy are organic laws and cannot be changed unilaterally 
but the Constitutional itself can be reformed by the centre alone, as long as the dominant 
parties are in agreement.
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agreement (for Quebec and the Basque Country), to be put to refer-
endum anyway.
As to the division of powers, the tendency is to keep almost all 
domestic policy at the lower level, while leaving defence and foreign 
affairs to the higher level. A crucial issue is taxation and a lot of 
interest has been expressed in the Basque system, or concierto 
económico under which the Basque territories3 set and collect most 
taxes and pass on a share to the centre for common functions. The 
concierto exists for historic reasons in the Basque Country and Nav-
arre, where it was introduced in the nineteenth century after the 
abolition of the old foral system, conditions which do not exist else-
where, but the principle has been carried over to the Catalan pro-
posal for a ‘fiscal pact’ and Scottish proposals for ‘full fiscal auton-
omy’. In practice, the Basque system is constrained in a number of 
ways. Social security contributions are not included. Value Added 
Tax is harmonized with Spain as variation is not allowed within a 
single state according to EU rules. The overall tax burden has to be 
similar to that elsewhere in Spain; and there are agreements about 
debts and deficits required to meet European monetary rules. This 
leaves the Basque provinces with leeway over the marginal corpora-
tion and income tax rates, excise duties and, crucially, allowances. 
The Ibarretxe Plan proposed to include the social security contribu-
tions and the CiU and Esquerra proposals essentially follow this. 
Reform Scotland’s proposals are less radical, leaving VAT and social 
security contributions to Westminster. The Parti Québécois would 
take all taxation power to Quebec, while the Allaire Plan appears to 
leave each level to raise the taxes required for its own purposes, 
although the details are not clear.
Devolution-max proposals involve the transfer of a range of 
domestic competences but the most important by far concern the 
social security system. At present, unemployment insurance is han-
dled by the upper level in all cases as are pensions in Spain and the 
UK, although not in Quebec which, uniquely among Canadian prov-
inces, has its own public pension scheme. Welfare benefits are pro-
vincial in Canada but state-wide in the European cases. The Ibarretxe 
Plan provides for devolution of social security but, at the insistence 
3. Not the Basque Government or Parliament but the three historic territories. They pass 
on a share to finance the Basque Government and a further share in turn is passed to 
Madrid. Navarre, which is a single territory, has a similar system.
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of Ibarretxe’s coalition partners, the Basque post-Communists, there 
are provisions for harmonization of rates and coverage and trans-
ferability with the rest of Spain. Esquerra proposes to repatriate 
social security, while CiU would devolve the management of it but 
leave the basic scheme with the state and allow Catalonia to par-
ticipate in decisions on rates and coverage through bilateral com-
mission. Reform Scotland divides social security benefits between 
the two levels, with pensions and unemployment benefits reserved 
to Westminster.
None of the proposals involves dividing the currency. The Par-
ti Québécois proposed keeping the Canadian dollar (and even used 
the Canadian dollar coin as the O in the Oui to independence). The 
SNP would keep the Pound sterling, with the option to adopt the 
Euro later on, following a referendum; devo-max proposals make 
the same assumption. Catalan and Basque proposals would simply 
keep the Euro.
Foreign affairs and defence are traditionally at the heart of 
state sovereignty, but the distinction between foreign and domestic 
policy is increasingly hard to make, as international regimes pene-
trate almost all policy spheres. The issue is particularly difficult 
within the European Union, where large areas of domestic policy 
are subject to co-decision. Even the SNP’s independence proposals 
refer to co-ordination in foreign policies and the possibility of shared 
diplomatic representations. The Esquerra lists diplomatic represen-
tation, international treaties and defence as areas for co-decision. 
There would be a Catalan repesentative in delegations to the EU, 
with the Catalan decision being determinate in matters within its 
exclusive responsibility.4 CiU proposes something similar. Ibarretxe 
promises ‘direct’ representation in the EU but this in practice seems 
to mean something similar to the Catalan proposals. There was also 
a reference to the Lamassoure initiative to recognize regions as ‘part-
ners of the Union’ but Lamassoure’s idea was no more than an ar-
rangement for administrative delegation in the implementation of 
EU programmes and petered out rather soon.5 Basque and Catalan 
proposals also demand representation in international bodies, no-
tably UNESCO, the latter on the ground that education and culture 
4. This actually forms part of the revised (2006) Catalan Statute of Autonomy, although 
the interpretation is rather narrow.
5. One of the few jurisdictions to show an interest was Scotland.
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are devolved and that they have their own distinct concerns, includ-
ing language. The Parti Québécois provided for the joint ministerial 
council to have a major role in defence and foreign affairs.
Defence and security also now cross the boundaries of foreign 
and domestic policy, given the ‘new security agenda’, which includes 
terrorism, drug and people trafficking, and financial crime. CiU does 
not deal with this matter, but Esquerra proposes shared responsibil-
ity, with the Generalitat of Catalonia having command of Spanish 
armed forces based there with ‘territorial defence’ a shared respon-
sibility. The SNP wants a separate Scottish armed forces, but accepts 
joint actions and the possibility of British bases. On the other hand, 
it refuses to countenance the presence of nuclear weapons6 and is 
officially opposed to NATO membership (although there are constant 
suggestions that it might change its position on NATO). The Parti 
Québécois proposals provide for joint defence and joint action with-
in NATO.
Another issue that straddles the foreign-domestic divide is 
im migration. Quebec already has a provision for selecting its own im-
migrants within the overall Canadian quota and the CiU and Ibar-
retxe ask for something similar, while Esquerra sees this as a Cata-
lan competence.
Culture and language are crucial in Quebec, Catalonia and the 
Basque Country and in all cases these are exclusively to be vested in 
the lower level. So is responsibility for broadcasting and, generally 
speaking, communications regulation. There have been frequent 
suggestions in Scotland that broadcasting regulation should be de-
volved, but also that an independent Scotland could continue to 
share the BBC.
There is a broad recognition across these various proposals of 
interdependence and the impossibility, in modern government, of 
making a clear division of competences, whether between external 
and domestic policy or between tiers of government. There is a con-
sequent tendency to resort to joint mechanisms for policy-making. 
These differ from the familiar mechanisms of intergovernmental pol-
icy-making in that they are almost always bilateral, recognizing the 
distinct character of the jurisdiction in question and its status as a 
self-determining entity. The Allaire proposals suggest that other prov-
inces might adopt the same status, leaving Canada as a rather loose 
6. This is a very important issue, as the British Trident nuclear force is based on Scotland.
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holding arrangement for the provinces but the Catalan and Scottish 
proposals do not make reference to other parts of the state.
4. The Scope of Devolution-Max
There are many differences in the details offered by the various de-
volution-max and independence-lite options and we would learn lit-
tle by focusing on the minutiae, which are often rather vague. What 
is more important is to assess the overall scope of the proposals in 
relation to the broad compass of government. All would entail the 
domestication of most taxation and spending and of the balance be-
tween public and private consumption. This question, of the overall 
size and scope of the state, is one of the central issues of modern 
politics. In spite of pressures to globalization and international com-
petition, states vary greatly in the size of their public sectors and their 
spending priorities. There is no one recipe for success, since both the 
high-spending social democratic states and the low-taxing neo-liber-
al ones seem to be viable.
Devolution-max jurisdictions could thus follow the high taxa-
tion-high spending route of the Nordic countries; or a neo-liberal 
route of competing through reduction in taxes and costs of produc-
tion. This has caused a lot of confusion, especially in Scotland, where 
fiscal autonomy has become closely associated with the case for cut-
ting business taxes in order to attract mobile capital. It is even sug-
gested that tax-cuts would pay for themselves by attracting more 
investment, a variation on the Laffer curve theory. This is little more 
than wishful thinking. Aggressive tax-cutting, even if it did work, 
would be imitated by other jurisdictions, leading to a race to the 
bottom as governments deprived themselves of revenue without 
gaining additional investment. It would provide a gift to existing 
businesses including, in Scotland, the oil companies and the banks, 
and would provide incentives for transfer pricing or ‘brass plate’ 
relocations so as to declare profits in the low-tax jurisdiction. Euro-
pean-wide pressures for corporate taxation harmonization, already 
aimed at Ireland and the Basque Country, would grow.
It would therefore be necessary to face up to the choices and 
decide whether to follow a social democratic or a neo-liberal line. 
Given the balance in Scottish politics and the fact that one of the 
mainsprings of the push to devolution was to defence the welfare 
settlement in Scotland, it is difficult to see a neo-liberal strategy being 
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politically viable there. Despite is promises of tax cuts, the SNP still 
defines itself as social democratic. In Quebec, the Alliance Démocra-
tique did at one stage push a strongly neo-liberal form of autonomism 
but this eventually failed and the market there seems limited. Con-
vergència i Unió has had a social welfare tradition but recently seems 
more committed to neo-liberalism; whether this will be politically 
marketable in the long run remains to be seen. Esquerra Republicana 
is certainly on the social democratic side. There is also a strong social 
welfare tradition in the Basque Country. Neo-liberal regionalism of 
the sort advocated by Ohmae (1995) seems an unlikely prospect.
In that case, the route to competitiveness will have to lie in social 
investment so as to raise standards of education, training and health 
and in investment in innovation and technology. Small independent 
states can do very well in global and European markets, as the Nordic 
social democracies have shown. Large internal markets are no longer 
necessary and smallness can even carry advantages in the form of short-
lines of communication, integrated networks of policy-makers and flex-
ibility. Small jurisdictions with control over the main taxing and spend-
ing programmes could follow the same route. These advantages do 
not, however, flow automatically but are embedded in historical prac-
tice or have to be created. This implies that changes in internal institu-
tions and practice would have to accompany constitutional change.
The SNP have claimed that the difference between devolution-
max and their version of independence-lite is that in the latter case 
Scotland would control the macro-economic ‘levers necessary to pro-
mote growth (Scottish Government, 2009). This is very dubious. Inde-
pendence-lite leaves the currency and therefore control over monetary 
policy with the UK government; the same applies to the tripartite 
proposals for Quebec sovereignty with partnership, although that 
envisaged some joint responsibility for monetary policy. This would, 
in turn, have implications for fiscal policy, which would have to adapt 
to the externally-imposed monetary constraints. Indeed it has been 
suggested that there would have to be some kind of fiscal pact akin 
to that existing within the Euro zone. Esquerra and CiU both suggest 
that Catalonia would have representation within the Bank of Spain; 
but the crucial issue is representation at the European Central Bank, 
which is operationally independent and whose board is composed of 
state nominees. Self-governing nations under both devolution-max 
and independence-lite would be macro-economic policy takers rather 
than policy makers, although this is also true of many EU states includ-
ing Spain.
23
REAF, núm. 16, octubre 2012, p. 9-29
Rethinking Sovereignty
5. Problems
One of the most difficult questions in territorial relations within 
modern states concerns the distribution of resources, whether 
through the uneven impact of central state spending or through 
explicit fiscal equalization. As states lose their ability to manage their 
spatial economies, there has been a move from cooperative to com-
petitive regionalism, with territories seeking their own place in the 
global market place. Political elites in wealthy regions seek to des-
olidarize from their poorer compatriots, since transfers no longer 
necessarily come back to them in the form of purchases of their 
products. Sub-state nationalists shift the focus of solidarity from the 
state to the smaller territorial scale. On the other hand, all the evi-
dence we have suggests that there is still widespread support for 
territorial redistribution in principle, even in the wealthy regions. 
With independence, of course, there would no longer be a question 
of sharing wealth with other territories but in any scenario short of 
this there might be. The Allaire proposals provide for a continued 
scheme of equalization, on the assumption that Quebec will be a 
net recipient. Ibarretxe continues the existing concierto económico, 
which leaves the Basque Country outside the revenue-sharing scheme 
although providing for a small amount of equalization since pay-
ments into Spain are partly geared to income. This leaves the Basque 
Country, which is a wealthy territory, contributing much less than 
Catalonia. Neither CiU nor Esquerra questions the principle of ter-
ritorial solidarity but want transfers to be reduced, an opinion gen-
erally shared in Catalonia. There are disputes about the present fis-
cal balance between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, 
some of the difference hinging in the treatment of oil revenues but, 
whichever side is right, the flows are much smaller than in the case 
of Catalonia, so the issue is less fraught. Nationalists claim that Scot-
land is subsidizing the rest of the UK, which makes it difficult to 
claim that full fiscal autonomy should be accompanied by an equal-
ization scheme and proposals have generally avoided the issue. Re-
form Scotland does not provide for any equalization. Nor have the 
unionist parties been any more forthcoming. The Calman Commission 
(Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009) and the subsequent Scot-
land Bill providing for sharing income tax simply leave in place the 
Barnett Formula for allocating the rest of the revenues; it is based 
on a combination of historic spending and population, with no ad-
justment for either needs or resources.
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Devolution of the social security and welfare systems, in whole 
or in part, will tend to shift the locus of social citizenship from the 
state to the devolved or federated territory. In the United Kingdom 
this provoked some concern from the Calman Commission ((Commis-
sion on Scottish Devolution, 2009) and the New Labour think tank 
Institute for Public Policy Research that this would in itself undermine 
social citizenship. In the wider literature three arguments are advanced 
for this. One is that the ´nation´ is itself a community of solidarity 
(Miller, 1995). However, the nation may not correspond with the state 
and other spaces, including stateless nations, could equally well be 
sites of solidarity and social citizenship (McEwen and Moreno, 2005; 
Béland and Lecours, 2008; Keating, 2009). Second, it is argued that 
solidarity is best organized at the highest level, where more resourc-
es can be mobilized. Yet smaller nations tend, in general, to be more 
solidaristic and the widest unit, the European Union, is the least soli-
daristic of all. Third, the literature on fiscal federalism sometimes ex-
presses a fear that devolution of welfare will result in competitive 
regionalism and a race to the bottom. Yet it is equally plausible to 
hypothesize race to the top as has happened in Spain (Gallego and 
Subirats, 2011) and the United Kingdom, where the devolved territo-
ries have tended to enhance social entitlements and make them more 
universal.
There is, moreover, a curious finding emerging both from com-
parative work (Jeffery, Lodge and Schmueker, 2010; Sturm et al., 2010) 
and from CIS studies in Spain, that citizens in devolved territories will 
often favour more autonomy for their region but at the same time 
prefer that service standards and entitlements be the same throughout 
the state. This is less pronounced in stateless nations and regions with 
a strong cultural identity, but it is still there. It suggests that devolution 
max might lead to less divergence than might otherwise be possible, 
and that there could be mechanisms, including imitation and learning 
and even loose coordination akin to the EU’s Open Method of Coop-
eration, to prevent welfare standards getting too far out of line.
A recurrent issue in the United Kingdom is the West Lothian 
Question, concerning the rights of members of the central parliament 
from asymmetrically devolved territories to vote on issues that concern 
the rest of the state but not themselves. This exists under any form of 
asymmetrical devolution but assumes extra force when taxation is 
asymmetrically devolved. The UK Government has appointed a com-
mission to examine the issue, following an election promise and de-
volution in 1999 already resulted in a reduction in the number of 
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Scottish MPs (but only to correct an existing over-representation). The 
issue does not seem to have the same resonance elsewhere. Quebec 
MPs can vote on the Canada Pension Plan and, even more strikingly, 
MPs from the Basque Nationalist Party have frequently pacted with 
Spanish governments of both main parties to support the Spanish 
budget, in return for concessions on Basque autonomy. Neither the 
Allaire Report, the Ibarretxe Plan nor the CiU proposals make any 
reference to the question and Esquerra only makes mention of con-
tinued Catalan representation in the Senate.
There is frequent recourse in all these proposals to bilateralism 
and shared competences, which raises a number of questions. Each 
proposal assumes a single bilateral deal but, putting the Ibarretxe and 
Esquerra proposals together would produce two associated states in 
Spain. Devo-max for Catalonia as suggested by CiU would trigger par-
ity demands in the Basque Country and probably other autonomous 
communities as well. Wales has been catching up with constitutional 
development in Scotland and will no doubt continue to do so. Bilat-
eralism (or multilateralism if other territories are included) rests upon 
the idea of negotiation and compromise but there are important 
considerations of power. The smaller territory would be the weaker 
party and might have to concede more.
Then there is the position of the majority nation, whose attitudes 
have differed from one case to another. In Canada outside Quebec 
and in Spain outside the minority nations there has been resistance 
to asymmetry and an insistence that either Quebec, the Basque Coun-
try and Catalonia should not get more autonomy or, if they do, that 
it should be extended all round. This is not the case in the United 
Kingdom, where opinion in England has little problem accepting asym-
metrical devolution. What is more difficult there is accepting the fed-
eral principle, that devolution might limit the freedom of the central 
parliament in its own sphere, as implied by devolution-max proposals 
for sharing powers and for negotiated representation in Europe. In 
Canada and Spain, there is even more resistance to the idea that the 
minority nations should enjoy a bilateral relationship with the centre. 
In Canada and Spain, this takes the form of resistance to radical change. 
In England, it often leads public and even elite opinion to the idea 
that Scottish independence would be a more acceptable choice, since 
that would allow England to reconstitute itself as a unitary state (al-
though it is not clear where Wales would fit in).
The final difficulty is the process of negotiating change. The 
Ibarretxe and Esquerra proposals clearly lie outside the Spanish con-
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stitution and would thus require constitutional change, although 
CiU has argued that it could stretch constitutional interpretation to 
cover its demands. Allaire was clearly a demand for constitutional 
change. In the United Kingdom the issue is moot since the constitu-
tion is unwritten and can be changed very easily. Unionists in all 
countries, however, have raised a more fundamental objection, that 
autonomy of whatever sort cannot be considered a right in the way 
that self-determination is, since it requires negotiation and agree-
ment of both sides. This, I have argued above, is unfounded since 
any exercise in self-determination requires negotiation and any 
agreement, including independence, will have two sides and a lot 
of detailed bargaining.
Constitutionalism is about getting the widest agreement on 
governing arrangements in conditions where there is not an existing 
consensus, which necessarily entails compromise. This might seem to 
run against the idea of self-determination where that is seen as an 
absolute claim. It might also run against the idea of using the refer-
endum, since that tends to polarize opinion. Yet public opinion in all 
the cases reviewed here has no problem with mixed solutions; it 
is the political elites who cling to outdated notions of sovereignty. 
Referendums can be a means of endorsing compromises (as in North-
ern Ireland) as well as answering ´clear´ questions. Forcing politics 
into the procrustean model of classical statehood is therefore a viola-
tion of democratic principles as well as popular opinion. Canada and 
the United Kingdom have come further than Spain in recognizing 
that, ultimately, Quebec and Scotland have a right to seceded. None 
of the states, however, has found a way of giving their constituent 
nations what they actually want.
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ABSTRACT
National self-determination does not necessarily entail independence. Many 
nationality movements in Europe have historically called for a continued 
association with the host state. Non-nationalist parties, in turn, have often 
embraced various forms of devolution. This has opened up a middle ground, 
in the form of ‘independence-lite’ or ‘devolution max’, which would give 
nations control of most domestic policy. Proposals on these lines have been 
put forward in Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Scotland. These 
would allow stateless nations to strike distinct social and economic compro-
mises. They would not give them control over the levers of macro-economic 
policy. They would entail a bilateral relationship with the state. Such propos-
als have not found favour with state majorities, and recent debates have 
been characterized by rather traditional assertions of sovereignty at odds 
with our interdependent world.
Key words: self-determination; devolution; independence; nationalism.
RESUM
L’autodeterminació nacional no implica necessàriament independència. Molts 
moviments nacionalistes en la història d’Europa han necessitat una contínua 
associació amb l’Estat amfitrió. D’altra banda, alguns partits no nacionalistes 
han adoptat ocasionalment diverses formes de descentralització. Això ha 
obert la porta a propostes a mig camí entre els dos extrems, en forma 
d’”independència mínima” o “desconcentració màxima”, que donarien als 
països control sobre la política nacional. Les propostes sobre aquestes línies 
s’han presentat al Quebec, a Catalunya, al País Basc i a Escòcia, propostes 
que permetrien a les nacions sense estat aconseguir compromisos socials i 
econòmics, si bé no els donaria control sobre la política macroeconòmica. Es 
tracta de propostes que impliquen una relació bilateral amb l’Estat. Aquestes 
propostes no han trobat el favor de les majories estatals, i els debats recents 
s’han caracteritzat per afirmacions de sobirania en la línia més tradicionalis-
ta i en absoluta discordança amb un món cada cop més interdependent.
Paraules clau: autodeterminació; descentralització; independència; naciona-
lisme.
RESUMEN
La autodeterminación nacional no implica necesariamente independencia. 
Muchos movimientos nacionales en la historia de Europa han requerido una 
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continua asociación con el Estado anfitrión. A su vez, algunos partidos no 
nacionalistas han adoptado en ocasiones diversas formas de descentralización. 
Ello ha abierto la puerta a propuestas a medio camino entre ambos extremos, 
en forma de “independencia-mínima” o “desconcentración máxima”, que 
ofrecerían a los países control sobre su política nacional. Las propuestas sobre 
estas líneas se han presentado en Quebec, en Cataluña, en el País Vasco y en 
Escocia, propuestas que permitirían a las naciones sin estado alcanzar distin-
tos compromisos sociales y económicos, si bien no control sobre la política 
macroeconómica. Se trata de propuestas que implican una relación bilateral 
con el Estado. Estas propuestas no han encontrado el favor de las mayorías 
estatales, y los debates recientes se han caracterizado por afirmaciones de 
soberanía en la línea más tradicionalista que no casan con un mundo cada 
vez más interdependiente.
Palabras clave: autodeterminación; descentralización; independencia; nacio-
nalismo.
